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SIMULASI DETERMINISTIK DAN STOKASTIK UNTUK 
PENYAKIT BERJANGKIT 
 
ABSTRAK 
Pemodelan dinamik untuk transmisi penyakit berjangkit di dalam satu kawasan 
tertentu ialah fokus utama tesis ini. Pergerakan individu yang telah dijangkit dari satu 
kawasan ke kawasan lain menggalakkan penyebaran penyakit berjangkit, contohnya 
sindrom pernafasan akut teruk (SARS) and influenza A (H1N1). Objektif utama 
kajian ini adalah untuk mengembangkan keupayaan pihak berkuasa kesihatan awam 
di Malaysia bagi merancang and melaksanakan strategi intervensi yang efektif untuk 
mengurangkan wabak epidemik pada masa depan. Kerjasama antara pihak berkuasa 
kesihatan dan masyarakat tempatan adalah penting untuk melaksanakan langkah-
langkah mitigasi bagi mengurangkan jangkitan tempatan. Bagi tujuan ini, model 
influenza simulasi berdasarkan formulasi SIR dan nama kodnya FluSiM telah 
dikembangkan untuk menyiasat dinamik transmisi penyakit berjangkit dan untuk 
mencadangkan strategi intervensi yang sesuai bagi mengawal wabak epidemik. 
FluSiM asas Window yang mesra pengguna telah dikembangkan untuk membantu 
pelajar-pelajar siswazah universiti sertai penyelidik akademik menjalankan 
penyelidikan epidemiologi. Versi FluSiM ini juga digunakan untuk mensimulasikan 
influenza pandemik 1918 di Switzerland, H1N1 2009 in Amerika Syarikat (AS) and 
Furunculosis in populasi salmon. FluSiM deterministik ini kemudiannya 
dipertingkatkan ke model stokastik dengan merangkumi ciri-ciri stokastik di dalam 
transmisi penyakit. FluSiM stokastik ini digunakan untuk menyiasat ketidaktentuan 
semasa wabak epidemik. Simulasi FluSiM stokastik menunjukkan bahawa 
keheterogenan ketara dalam satu populasi mungkin menjadi penghalang kepada 
pelaksanaan intervensi yang efektif. FluSiM juga dipertingkatkan ke model meta-
populasi untuk mengkaji penyebaran SARS dari Hong Kong ke Singapura pada 
xi 
tahun 2003. Simulasi menunjukkan bahawa strategi intervensi seperti kempen 
vaksinasi dan pejarakan sosial perlu dilaksanakan apabila wabak epidemik disahkan. 
Kefahaman yang diperolehi daripada penyelidikan ini pada subjek transmisi penyakit 
and strategi intervensi akan berguna untuk mengawal wabak epidemik pada masa 
depan di Malaysia.  
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DETERMINISTIC AND STOCHASTIC SIMULATIONS OF  
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
 
ABSTRACT 
Modeling the dynamics of infectious disease transmission in a specific region is the 
main focus of this thesis. Movements of infective individuals from one region to 
another promote the spread of infectious diseases, such as severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) and influenza A (H1N1). The primary objective of this research is 
to develop the capability within Malaysian public health authorities to plan and 
implement intervention strategies that is effective for mitigating future epidemic 
outbreaks. The collaboration between health authorities and local community is 
essential in implementing mitigation measures to reduce local infection. For this 
purpose, an influenza simulation models-based upon the SIR formulation and 
codenamed FluSiM is developed to investigate the dynamics of infectious disease 
transmission and to suggest appropriate intervention strategies to control the 
epidemic outbreak. The user-friendly Window-based FluSiM is developed to aid 
university graduate students as well as academic researchers in conducting 
epidemiology related research. This version of FluSiM is also used to simulate the 
1918 influenza pandemic in Switzerland, the H1N1 2009 in United States of America 
(USA) and Furunculosis in salmon population. This deterministic FluSiM is later 
enhanced into a stochastic model by incorporating stochasticity in disease 
transmission characteristics. This stochastic FluSiM is utilized to investigate the 
uncertainties during an epidemic outbreak. Simulations of stochastic FluSiM indicate 
that significant heterogeneity in population may be a hindrance to implementation of 
effective interventions. FluSiM is also enhanced into a meta-population model to 
study the spread of SARS in 2003 from Hong Kong to Singapore. Simulations 
indicate that intervention strategies such as vaccination campaign and social 
xiii 
distancing should be implemented once an epidemic outbreak is confirmed. The 
insights gained from this research on disease transmission and intervention strategies 
would be useful for control of future epidemic outbreaks in Malaysia.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction to Infectious Disease 
Infectious diseases are viral or bacterial diseases that are transmitted from human to 
human and have the potential to develop into an epidemic outbreak. Infectious 
diseases have severely afflicted humankind in the past, and despite improved 
medication and extensive vaccination program, they continue to be a major cause of 
suffering and mortality in the present world. Infectious disease viruses undergo 
continuous evolution or mutation, leading to emergence of novel infectious diseases 
that causes epidemic outbreaks. The viruses also have a strong adapting ability which 
allows them to circulate in a human population. This in turn results in the existing 
infectious disease persisting and continuing to spread within the population. 
 
In recent past, the most remarkable epidemic outbreaks are Severe Acute Respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) in 2003 and influenza A (H1N1) in 2009 which first emerged in 
China and Mexico respectively. SARS is a disease that originated from a mutation of 
a wild animal coronavirus; while H1N1 is a disease that combines a swine and a 
human influenza strains. During these disease outbreaks, public health authorities 
implemented several control measures to minimize the infection but some control 
measures were not as effective as expected. Thus these infectious diseases were able 
to cause severe mortalities and economic hardships. Humankind will undoubtedly 
face more novel and lethal infectious disease challenges in future. Therefore this has 
increased the urgency to be on alert and has promoted the need to develop an early 
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warning system in order to allow community to take adequate control measures to 
mitigate infectious disease transmissions with advance notice.  
 
1.2 Influenza A (H1N1) in 2009 
In early April of 2009, a novel influenza A (H1N1) emerged in Veracruz, Mexico 
and spread rapidly throughout the world, causing the influenza pandemic. On 29 
April, 2009 The World Health Organization (WHO) declared the global pandemic 
alert level to Phase 5, indicating sustained human-to-human transmission. During the 
early stage of H1N1 pandemic, there were uncertainties about all aspects of this 
outbreak, including virulence, transmissibility and origin of the virus. Many feared 
that this outbreak is uncontrollable and will cause significant mortality and economic 
loss. 
 
Promoted by international travel pattern, the H1N1 virus spread rapidly via air 
traveling, infecting 74 countries within five weeks from the initial outbreak in 
Mexico. During the initial outbreak period, more than 300,000 people traveled 
internationally from Mexico each week. This in turn results in difficulties in disease 
containment as hundreds of infected individuals had traveled aboard before the virus 
was identified. In the first week of May, 3,000 new infections were identified in 
United States (US), Canada and Europe.  
 
There were several control measures taken to minimize the infection of H1N1 during 
its outbreaks. In Mexico, the government implemented a period of national 
quarantine starting in May by closing restaurant and schools. In the US, the Center of 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) developed a vaccine for H1N1 during the 
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second wave in the fall season. In Canada and Europe, the public health authorities 
focused on quarantine of infective individuals and limited their mobility. In April 
2010, WHO lifted the global pandemic alert but declared that there is a possibility of 
H1N1 recurrence. The H1N1 outbreaks in 2009 has caused severe mortality and 
great losses in global economic.  
 
1.3 Epidemiology Modeling 
Epidemiology is the study of the distribution and determinants of disease prevalence 
in a host population. The main objective of epidemiologists is to identify the causes 
and risk factors for diseases. This in turn aids the public health authorities to plan, 
implement and evaluate control and prevention measures during a disease outbreak. 
Thus epidemiology modeling refers to dynamic modeling where the host population 
is divided into compartments based on their epidemiological status. The movements 
between compartments by infected, recovered or migrated individuals are 
specifically defined by a system of differential equations or other types of 
formulations.  
 
The first structured mathematical model in epidemiology is Susceptible-Infected-
Recovered (SIR) model which was initially developed by Kermack and McKendrick 
in 1927. In the development of the SIR model, the most outstanding result obtained 
was the Threshold Theorem which is used to determine if an infectious disease can 
evolve to an epidemic outbreak. If the susceptible population exceeds a certain 
critical value, then there is a possibility that the infectious disease may cause a local 
epidemic. Later in the middle of twentieth century, many epidemiologists and 
modelers developed a variety of models using SIR model as a prototype to 
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investigate the dynamics of a specific infectious disease transmission, and thus 
epidemiology modeling started to grow exponentially. Recent approaches in 
epidemiology modeling including deterministic and stochastic models are often 
implemented using computer simulation to fit the observed data in order to have 
better insights of infectious disease transmissions. In recent years, epidemiology 
modeling has an increasing influence on the theory and practice of disease 
management and control, and becomes very important for decision making of 
infectious disease intervention strategies in many countries.  
 
1.4 Objectives of Thesis 
The objectives of this thesis research include: 
1. To develop the influenza simulation model FluSiM; 
2. To use the in-house deterministic FluSiM for simulating the 1918 influenza 
pandemic, the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) and Furunculosis in Chinook salmon; 
3. To investigate the uncertainties during an epidemic outbreak by means of the 
in-house stochastic FluSiM; 
4. To use the meta-population FluSiM for simulating the 2003 severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) spread from Hong Kong to Singapore; 
5. To assess the effectiveness of intervention strategies including vaccination 
campaign and social distancing by means of FluSiM simulations. 
 
1.5 Scope and Organization of Thesis 
This thesis begins with a brief introduction to infectious disease and its impact on 
human population, drawing insights from past epidemic outbreaks such as severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and influenza A (H1N1). The need of 
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incorporating epidemiology modeling in epidemic management is then explored, 
leading to the main focus of this thesis. The objectives, scope and organization of 
this thesis are then described. 
 
Chapter 2 presents a review of related literature, beginning with an introduction to 
epidemiology modeling that includes mechanism of disease transmission, 
applications and limitations of epidemiology modeling. SIR and SEIR models are 
introduced in this chapter by describing their model equations and basic reproduction 
number R0. These insights stimulate our interest in developing an in-house influenza 
simulation model codenamed FluSiM. This is followed by a brief exploration of 
unique epidemic phenomenon that includes global influenza transmission and 
multiple infection waves. A discussion on intervention strategies of influenza 
transmission is presented in the last section in this chapter.  
 
A detailed discussion on the SIR model forms the main focus for Chapter 3, which 
stimulates the interest in developing a user-friendly Window-based FluSiM that 
displays suggestive icons representing the key disease transmission parameters. A 
simple guidebook is included in this chapter to aid FluSiM users for utilizing this 
simulation model in conducting epidemiology related research. Three different 
epidemic outbreaks cases are studied and revised using this FluSiM in the subsequent 
sections. Simulations of FluSiM that incorporate intervention strategies such as 
vaccination campaign and social distancing will round up this chapter. 
 
The limitations of deterministic SIR model as it is premised upon homogeneous 
mixing assumption will first be discussed in Chapter 4. This leads to the 
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development of stochastic FluSiM, an enhanced model that allows key disease 
transmission parameters to randomly change with time, following a specified normal 
distribution. This version of FluSiM is utilized to simulate different epidemic 
scenarios that have different values of basic reproduction number for investigating 
the uncertainties during an epidemic outbreak. This chapter will end with 
investigations of heterogeneity as a hindrance in reducing the effectiveness of the 
implemented intervention during an epidemic outbreak.  
 
Often a disease virus will spread from a source region to another uninfected region 
before the end of the local epidemic outbreak. The global pandemic phenomenon is 
the main focus of Chapter 5. A meta-population FluSiM is proposed and developed 
for investigating the inter-regional disease transmission. This is followed by 
sensitivity analyses of two newly introduced parameters that affect the exportation of 
infective individuals from one subpopulation to another. Furthermore, meta-
population FluSiM is applied to study and update the 2003 SARS transmission from 
Hong Kong to Singapore for fitting the primary and secondary collected data to 
FluSiM.  
 
This thesis ends with a brief summary regarding future research direction on 
infectious disease transmission simulation in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Epidemiology Modeling 
In recent years, modeling is widely applied to study the spread of an infectious 
disease in a host population for obtaining information and explanations that may be 
applicable to a future epidemic outbreak with similar disease characteristics. 
Experiments with disease transmission on human are impossible as they are unethical. 
Therefore the data for testing models generally originate from past documented 
epidemics such as the 1918 influenza pandemic, the Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) in 2003 and the influenza A (H1N1) in 2009. 
 
The mathematical and public health approaches to the model developments have 
diverged in the past, and the communication gap between modelers and public health 
authorities has evolved. However, there have been strenuous efforts to connect this 
gap during the SARS epidemic outbreaks in 2003. The importance of these efforts is 
highlighted in the development of mathematical models for evaluating the disease 
intervention strategies. Participants at a Canadian pandemic preparedness workshop 
held in 2008 noted that models are most useful when they are developed in 
synergistic cooperation between modelers and public health authorities (Arino et al., 
2011).   
 
Modeler and public health authorities may have different viewpoints or perspectives. 
Modelers are more interested in solving epidemiology models to hopefully obtain 
better insights of the mechanisms of disease transmission; while public health 
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authorities would need detailed analysis for specific circumstances in order to answer 
policy questions. The decisions made by public health authorities are usually 
influenced by political considerations. Thus they need to take into account scientific 
information into their decision making, keeping the political perspectives in close 
focus. Collaboration between modelers and public health authorities is needed in 
model development in order to support complex decision makings. 
 
This section of literature review attempts to provide a summary of epidemiology 
modeling with application to epidemic outbreak scenarios. This is divided into 
several sections, such as the mechanism of disease transmission, advantages and 
disadvantages of certain models, applications and limitations of epidemiology 
modeling.  
 
2.1.1 Mechanism of Disease Transmission 
Over the years viruses have infected human population, transmitted from one 
population to another by some forms of contact, spread through a part of the 
population and later disappeared without infecting the entire population. The first 
epidemic model, namely the SIR model, developed by Kermack and McKendrick in 
1927 exhibits this mechanism of disease transmissions (Bailey, 1975; Brauer et al., 
2008; Frauenthal, 1980).  The SIR model is a compartmental model which divides 
the population N into three disjoint compartments consisting of the Susceptible S, 
Infective I and Recovered R. The Susceptible is an individual who has no immunity 
to the infectious disease, while the Infective is an individual who transmits the 
infection and the Recovered is an individual who recovers with immunity against re-
infection. The infectious disease is assumed to be transmitted to a susceptible 
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individual by an infective individual through contact during his infectious period. 
This model consists of rates at which individuals move from a compartment to 
another, and these rates lead to a system of differential equations that expresses the 
mechanism of disease transmission mathematically as shown in Equations (2.1) 
(Bailey, 1975; Frauenthal, 1980; Thieme, 2003). Detailed description and discussion 
of SIR model is later presented in Chapter 3. 
 
ds
SI
dt
  ;          
dI
SI I
dt
   ;          
dR
I
dt
 .             (2.1) 
 
During the course of an epidemic, the number of new infection increases initially to 
an epidemic peak, and then as the number of susceptible individual decreases, the 
number of new infection decreases, slowing the disease transmission and ultimately 
ending the epidemic. Hence all epidemiology models should exhibit this general 
pattern of epidemic evolution as displayed in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Epidemic evolution 
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2.1.2 Applications of Epidemiology Modeling 
The first advantage of epidemiology modeling is the clarification of assumptions 
about the biological and social mechanisms which affect disease transmissions 
(Frauenthal, 1980, Hethcote 2008). The model development process is essential to 
modelers as they have to be precise in the mechanism of disease transmission. 
Parameters which have well-understood epidemiological interpretation, such as 
contact rate β and infectious period 1/γ, are used in the SIR model development. A 
model using differential or difference equations (Kapur and Khan, 1981; Roeger and 
Barnard, 2007) is neither ambiguous nor vague if the parameters are precisely 
defined and each term in the equations is mechanistically explained. Equations (2.2) 
show the difference equations of SIR model. 
 
       1S t S t S t I t   ; 
         1I t I t S t I t I t     ; 
     1R t R t I t   .                (2.2) 
 
In order to utilize modeling effectively in epidemiology, one must understand the 
transmission of a specific disease, so that he can decide which necessary factors 
should be included in a model development for the disease. This option often 
depends on the particular questions that are to be answered. Simple models have 
small number of parameters as their advantage but they may be oversimplified. For 
example, SIR model has two parameters named contact rate β and recovery rate γ. In 
contrast, complex models may be more realistic, but they contain more parameters 
whose estimation value may not be readily obtained. For example, SEIR model 
which includes an Exposed compartment has one extra parameter named the average 
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latent period 1/α (Brauer et al., 2008, Hethcote, 2008). Equations (2.3) give the 
system of differential equations of SEIR model. 
 
ds
SI
dt
  ;          
dE
SI E
dt
   ;           
dI
E I
dt
   ;          
dR
I
dt
 .                         (2.3) 
 
The art of modeling is to make suitable options in model development so that the 
model is as simple as possible and yet it is adequate to answer the questions being 
considered. One of the applications of modeling is to allow explorations of the effect 
of different assumptions or various options available for the modeler to choose. For 
example, modelers can examine the effect of heterogeneous mixing between 
susceptible and infective individuals instead of homogeneous mixing. They can also 
examine the behavior of solution by including an exposed compartment for 
individuals in the latent period into the model (Brauer et al., 2008; Ng et al., 2003). 
The advantage of exploring different assumptions is to guide modelers in choosing a 
suitable model for a specific disease and to provide better insights for 
epidemiologists and public health authorities in planning intervention strategies to 
control the disease.  
 
After completing the model development, there are several mathematical methods 
available for solving and analyzing the model to determine the threshold relevant to 
the disease, to project the disease evolution, or to suggest control measures. Where 
analytical solutions are not possible, the behavior of solution can also be obtained 
using numerical methods in computer simulations. This stimulates the interest to 
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develop a flu transmission simulation model codenamed FluSiM for this research as 
later presented in Chapter 3. If the results of mathematical analysis and numerical 
simulation are in agreement, then these methods can be used in identifying important 
combination of parameters that are critical to the disease transmission. Key 
parameters, such as contact rate β and infectious period 1/γ, can be estimated via 
fitting the output from a model to the data collected. In addition, if parameters have 
been estimated from the literature, then these estimations can be checked using 
models. Thus modeling can be applied to check if the parameters and data actually fit 
into a consistent framework (Poletti et al., 2011). Comparisons in modeling can 
provide better understanding of the disease transmission. They are usually performed 
to estimate parameter values for a specific disease and then compare the parameter 
values. Outputs of a model are said to be sensitive to a parameter if a slight change in 
the parameter values causes a significant change in the output. On the other hand, a 
model is insensitive to a parameter if the outputs are almost the same for a broad 
range of parameter values. The determination of the parameter sensitivity and 
insensitivity are crucial as this provides insight into the disease transmission 
sensitivity (Hethcote, 2008). Efforts for collecting data to obtain better parameter 
estimations can be made if the parameter sensitivity is identified. Therefore modeling 
can help to identify important data that should be collected.  
 
Models in epidemiology can provide the concept of threshold, namely the basic 
reproduction number R0, which is used to determine if the disease can cause an 
epidemic outbreak (Brauer et al., 2008). Equations (2.4) and (2.5) show the R0 of SIR 
and SEIR models respectively. A detailed discussion of calculating this threshold in 
SIR model is presented in Chapter 3.  
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S0 is the number of susceptible individual at the beginning of the epidemic (time t = 
0). As observed in Equations (2.4) and (2.5), R0 is a combination of parameters from 
the model which gives the average number of new infections caused by an infective 
individual introduced into a completely susceptible population during his infectious 
period (Brauer et al., 2008; Thieme, 2003). This is the most valuable contribution of 
modeling to epidemiology as one can know the potential of an infectious disease to 
evolve into an epidemic outbreak, and later use it to plan intervention strategies in 
order to control the outbreak. Attack ratio A is another useful parameter to describe 
the severity of an epidemic outbreak (Arino et al., 2011). A is defined as the fraction 
of the susceptible population infected during the entire course of an epidemic and can 
be expressed in Equation (2.6). 
 
1
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A
N
                    (2.6) 
 
Sf is the number of susceptible population at the end of the epidemic. There is a 
mathematical relationship between R0 and A namely final size relation and is given in 
Equation (2.7). 
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Figure 2.2 displays a graphical relation between R0 and A in a population that has N = 
10000 and I(0) = 1. Attack ratio A is applied to evaluate the effectiveness of 
intervention strategies such as quarantine, social distancing and vaccination 
campaign as later presented in Chapter 3. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Basic reproduction number R0 versus attack ratio A 
 
Mathematical modeling and computer simulation are fundamental experiment tools 
for epidemiologist and modelers to build and test theories (Hethcote, 2008). The data 
usually available are from naturally occurring epidemics in the past because 
experiments with disease spread on human are impossible as they are unethical. 
Unfortunately these data are not complete nor easily available, because many cases 
were not reported. Since experiment and accurate data are usually not available in 
epidemiology, computer simulations must be used to perform necessary theoretical 
experiments with different parameter values and different data sets.  
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
A
tt
a
ck
 R
a
ti
o
 A
 
Basic Reproduction Number R0 
15 
 
A very important application of modeling in epidemiology is to perform theoretical 
evaluations and comparisons of intervention strategies (Cruz-Pacheco et al., 2009; 
Towers and Feng, 2009; Gjorgjieva et al., 2005). Cruz-Pacheco and his colleagues 
studied the national social distancing policy implemented by the Mexican Secretariat 
of Health during the H1N1 outbreak in Mexico, while Gjorgjieva and her colleagues 
conducted a research on the role of vaccination campaign in the control of SARS. 
Epidemiologists and public health authorities need to understand the effects of 
different control measures for making the best decision to minimize the infections. 
Qualitative results of models are always subject to uncertainties because the models 
are simplified and the parameters values can only be estimated. However, 
quantifications of the relative advantages of several control measures are often robust 
in the sense that the same conclusions hold for a wide range of parameter values and 
various models.  
 
The last application of modeling is to make forecasts regarding the future epidemics. 
People often think of forecast as the only application of modeling, but investigating 
the effectiveness of intervention strategies is more important. Accurate forecasts are 
impossible due to the simplified assumptions in model development and 
uncertainties in the parameter values. However, possible forecasts under different 
circumstances can sometimes be predicted or the general pattern can be identified if 
the uncertainties are reduced in future epidemic projections.   
 
2.1.3 Limitations of Epidemiology Modeling 
After discussing the applications of epidemiology modeling, it is necessary to discuss 
its limitations as well. Epidemiologists and modelers need to acknowledge both the 
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strength and weakness of modeling in epidemiology. The first limitation is that all 
deterministic models are simplifications of reality as they are developed based on 
several assumptions such as homogeneous mixing and the total population size is 
fixed (Brauer et al., 2008; Frauenthal, 1980). The deviation from reality of these 
simplifications varies with the disease and circumstances, and therefore it is difficult 
to be measured. For example, the SIR model is not a good description at the 
beginning of an epidemic outbreak because of its homogeneous mixing assumption 
which is not necessarily valid, if given stochasticity (Arino et al., 2011). Hence one 
can never be completely certain about the forecast results from deterministic models. 
Complex models are sometimes developed to obtain a better approximation of actual 
disease transmission but they require more data which are not readily available. 
 
Deterministic models are models that use difference or differential equations to 
describe the size changes of disease status compartments with time. These models do 
not reflect the role of probability or uncertainty in disease transmission as parameter 
values in these models are often set equal to the mean of observed values and the 
variance of parameters is ignored (Hethcote, 2008; Bailey, 1975). Furthermore, a set 
of initial conditions leads to exactly one output in deterministic models, thus there is 
no information available on the confidence in the model output. When parameters 
such as contact rate and basic reproduction number are estimated by fitting model 
output to observed data, confidence intervals on these parameters are not obtained. 
However, sensitivity analyses may be conducted to obtain understanding of the 
dependence on parameter values for determining the effects of changes in parameter 
values on model outputs. If the variance of the observed parameter value is low and 
the model outputs are sensitive to that parameter, then the confidence in the model 
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outputs would be low. Stochastic models incorporate probability, but it is difficult to 
obtain analytical result for these models and it requires large number of simulations 
to detect the behavior of a disease transmission for obtaining quantitative results 
(Hethcote, 2008). 
 
There are also some difficulties in the process of fitting models to observed data 
(Arino et al., 2011). Various kinds of bias may arise in the collection of observed 
data. Analysis of clinical data is complicated due to administrative factors such as 
reporting delays and inconsistencies in classification of clinical cases. This is 
particularly important for a disease such as influenza in which many cases are 
asymptomatic or very mild and therefore are not diagnosed or reported. Modelers 
often fit models to observed data in order to obtain a curve describing the evolution 
of an epidemic and to estimate key parameters, such as contact rate. However, fitting 
model outputs to observed data is only valid if the model produces outputs with the 
same meaning as the observed data, and often a model output may not give the true 
picture of observations. Epidemic data represents the number of reported infections, 
while model outputs represent the number of actual infections. Therefore a modeler 
should be aware when fitting the model to observed data.  
 
2.2 Effects of International Travel on Influenza Transmission 
In the past, international travels were less likely as people could only travel via land 
and water transports, but today’s people travel internationally via air transport 
because it is more convenient and faster if compared to the transportations in the past. 
Therefore people can move far frequently and with a high rate of long distance travel 
(Sattenspiel and Dietz, 1995). This in turn allows the intensive exportation of 
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infective individuals from a known source to other regions during a local epidemic 
outbreak.  
 
The international spread of influenza A (H1N1) in 2009 was more rapid than the 
previous global pandemics such as the 1918 influenza pandemic due to the tight 
connectivity of the globe through air travel. It is believed that the global spread of the 
1918 influenza pandemic was greatly influenced by military traffic in the First World 
War (Yoneyama & Krishnamoorthy, 2010) and it took 3 years to circle the globe 
(Hosseini et al., 2010). In contrast, the H1N1 virus in 2009 spread quickly via 
international air travel, infecting 74 different countries within five weeks of the 
Mexico outbreak in early April (CDC, 2010). The volume of air traveler determined 
the dynamics of the H1N1 global spread. At the onset of outbreak in Mexico, it is 
estimated 300,000 individuals flew internationally every week (Fraser et al., 2009). 
Infection rates in Mexico approximately reached 1 in 10,000 during early April, and 
hundreds of infected individuals most likely had already traveled to other countries 
before the H1N1 virus was identified (Chang et al., 2010). 
 
Of the 1.3 million individuals who traveled out of Mexico during April 2009, 68% of 
individuals traveled to United States (U.S), 16% traveled to Canada, 8% traveled to 
Europe and 7% traveled to Latin American. Later in the first two weeks of May, 
3,000 new infections were identified in U.S, Canada and Europe with 74%, 11% and 
7% of them respectively (Chang et al., 2010).  These results showed an agreement 
with the air travels out of Mexico. In conclusion, infectious diseases especially 
influenza is driven by international air travel and now become a more rapidly 
spreading international threat than ever before.  
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Figure 2.3 shows the global distribution of confirmed H1N1 infection in the second 
week of May, 2009. As observed in Figure 2.1, the countries in Northern Hemisphere 
were severely infected. Recent studies suggest that data on air travel can be used to 
forecast the spread of novel infectious disease (Massad et al., 2010; Ruan et al., 
2006), and this may buy time for the public health authorities to plan intervention 
strategies for controlling a local epidemic outbreak. This stimulates interest in 
developing meta-population models, which are collections of subpopulations with 
links between them, in order to investigate the international spread of an infectious 
disease. More complex meta-population models incorporating network and mobility 
of individuals are also developed to track the movements of individual and to study 
the effect of these movements on disease transmission between patches (Sattenspiel 
and Dietz, 1995). 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Global distribution of confirmed influenza A (H1N1) infection  
on May 8
th
, 2009 (Hosseini et al., 2010) 
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2.3 Multiple Infection Waves 
There is scientific evidence shows that the transmissibility of influenza is 
significantly affected by temperature and humidity (Arino et al., 2011; Fraser et al., 
2009). Therefore an epidemic begins in the spring may be less severe than in the fall, 
because the transmission decreases in the spring and later may recur in the fall with a 
more severe infection wave. In some populations, the 1918 influenza pandemic 
began in the spring, was essentially dormant in the summer and then reappeared in a 
much more severe form in the fall. As observed in Figure 2.4, the 1918 influenza 
pandemic in Geneva, Switzerland (Chowell et al., 2006b) exhibited this tread of 
infection which has higher severity in fall. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Daily number of hospital notifications of influenza cases during the 1918 
influenza pandemic in the Canton of Geneva, Switzerland (Chowell et al., 2006b) 
 
 
 
Often, the second infection wave is more severe for age groups that were not infected 
severely in the first wave, possibly because of partial immunity obtained via recovery 
during the first wave (Arino et al., 2011). During a second wave, there may be 
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mutation of the influenza virus to a more lethal strain or potentially severe bacterial 
co-infections. This suggests that after the first infection wave, even it appears not to 
be very severe, it is important to develop a vaccine for this strain that may provide at 
least partial immunity against a more lethal second wave. However, development of 
such a vaccine would consume some of the resources needed for the preparation of a 
vaccine for the next seasonal influenza, and it would be necessary to decide how to 
allocate these resources without knowing the relative severities of the seasonal and 
pandemic strains. It appears that vaccine manufacturing capacity for production both 
seasonal and pandemic vaccines at the same time is limited (Towers and Feng, 2009). 
Pandemic strains generally seem to displace the circulating seasonal strains and 
become the predominant strain in future influenza seasons. Seasonal variation in 
transmissibility is not the only suggested explanation for a second wave in a 
pandemic, and another possibility is co-infection with other respiratory diseases 
(Arino et al., 2011). This means that it is not possible to rely on a model to predict 
when a second wave may develop or how severe it may be. However, epidemiology 
models are still useful as an early warning system in order to allow public health 
authorities to take adequate mitigation measures with advance notice when a second 
infection wave occurs.  
 
2.4 Intervention Strategies of Influenza Transmission 
There are generally two stages to control the spread of influenza (Arino et al., 2011). 
The first stage is containment which attempts to limit the spread of influenza from a 
known source region to other regions. In this stage, mobility control of infective 
individuals and travel restriction are usually implemented to prevent exportation of 
infective individual to uninfected regions. The most ideal outcome of this stage is to 
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contain an influenza outbreak in the source region before it has the chance to spread 
to other regions. An epidemic usually starts in a remote region and it is impossible to 
diagnose the first infection quickly. This is particular significant for a disease like 
influenza because majority of transmissions is from infective individuals who do not 
show or do not yet have symptoms. The risks are even greater if the influenza 
emerges in a community that has limited medical resources. This stage is a pre-
pandemic scenario which has the possibility of eradicating the epidemic in the 
limited known sources. However, the influenza A (H1N1) in 2009 spread rapidly 
over the globe in the matter of few months via international air travel, and this has 
raised the question of whether travel restriction would slow the spread of this virus. 
Result from modeling, however, suggests that reduction of even more than 95% in 
international air travel could only delay the onset of an influenza outbreak (Arino et 
al., 2011). This would only buy additional time for strategizing mitigation, but this 
could risk pushing local epidemics forward until seasonal factors result in a more 
severe first wave of infection. Therefore public health authorities should be cautious 
on implementing travel restriction as it has pro’s and con’s.  
 
If the virus spreads into many different regions and starts circulating in the local 
populations, then containment is no longer effective in controlling the spread of 
influenza. At this stage, public health authorities will move to the second stage of 
intervention which is the mitigation mode. There are mainly three types of mitigation 
strategies: behavioral measures, vaccination before or during an epidemic and 
treatment during an epidemic (Cruz-Pacheco et al., 2009; Towers and Feng., 2009; 
Bootsma and Ferguson, 2007; Gumel et al., 2004).  
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Behavioral measures such as increased sanitary controls, avoidance of large public 
gathering and closure of public facilities are mainly implemented to decrease 
contacts between infective and susceptible individuals that are likely to contribute to 
new infections. In modeling, the contact rate β can be reduced by considering the 
implementation of behavioral measures, resulting in decreasing the reproduction 
number R. Figure 2.5 displays the linear relation between β and R. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Contact rate β versus reproduction number R 
 
If the contact rate β is reduced to a value of reproduction number R less than one, 
then the infection will be reduced to low level quickly, ultimately ending the 
epidemic. These behavioral measures are usually encouraged by public health 
authorities during the absent of pharmaceutical measures. In the 1918 influenza 
pandemic, there were no vaccines or antiviral drugs available, thus behavioral 
measures were the only option to decrease the infections (Arino et al., 2011). 
However, there are difficulties in implementing behavioral measures as individuals 
may be unwilling to stay at home from work during an epidemic outbreak. In 
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addition, closure of public facilities has economic and social costs, but school 
closures are more preferable to be implemented for decreasing contacts between 
children in order to reduce new infection in the wider community. Isolation of 
infective individuals and quarantine of individuals who are asymptomatic are 
measures that would decrease the new infections, but also have economic costs and 
may not be widely imposed nor accepted.  
 
Vaccination is the second aspect of mitigation that can be implemented before or 
during an epidemic outbreak. It is difficult to develop a vaccine for a novel influenza 
such as H1N1 in 2009, resulting in impossible to implement pre-vaccination 
campaign. During the early stage of H1N1 outbreaks, no vaccine was available and it 
took nearly six months to develop one using egg-based technology (Arino et al., 
2006). In SIR model, pre-vaccination campaign can be incorporated to reduce the 
number of susceptible individuals. This in turn decreases the basic reproduction 
number R0. Figure 2.6 shows the relation between initial number of susceptible 
individual S0 and R0.  
 
As observed in Figure 2.6, when a sufficient number of susceptible individual is 
vaccinated before an epidemic outbreak, the value of R0 can be reduced to less than 
one, indicating the disease fails to evolve into an epidemic outbreak. Elder 
individuals might have some residual immunity because of previous exposure to a 
similar influenza that may reduce susceptibility, resulting in elder individuals may be 
less susceptible than others during an epidemic outbreak. When a specific vaccine is 
developed for a novel influenza strain, it is possibly in a limited number of doses and 
this causes difficulty in deciding which groups of the population should be 
